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1. Introduction
"To better understand the determinants of bank regulatory and supervisory
policies and effective strategies for reforming those policies, future research
should use case studies to trace the forces shaping the evolution of bank
regulations and supervision.”1
Regardless of the exceptionally deep recession that the financial meltdown
brought about, the Great Recession has not been extraordinary.2 On the
contrary, as the current crisis fundamentally originates from past decisions
arguably tracing back for decades, all of the five economies concerned in this
paper (UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China), have a significant share in both
triggering as well as exacerbating the current downturn.
Subsequently, although it would be wrong to consider the Great Recession
unique per se, the global financial crisis has nevertheless emphasized that the
domestic economies affect each-other on a greater scale than ever before. At
the same time, since the focus of this paper is on international financial
regulations, the increasing inability to differentiate between the domestic and
international economic variables, directly relates to the core of this paper.
The numerous intergovernmental organizations such as the IMF, WTO,
WB, OSCDE, and some regulatory initiatives (e.g. Basel Accord, IOSCO,
IAIS)3 have not proven efficient enough. Mainly since their actual options are
ultimately limited to the governments’ individual interests. While observing
the G20 economies, the countries seem to have agreed that financial
regulations are the source of mutual interest.4 Nevertheless, while looking at
the policy outcomes, the cooperative atmosphere fades once compromises
need decisive finalization. Therefore, several questions spark. Are the real
economic interests genuinely mutual? And if not, does the economic status
quo incentivize the creation of enhanced international financial regulations?
1.1 Research Design
The goal of this paper is to examine, whether the economic status quo
incentivizes the creation of enhanced international financial regulations.
Explicitly, five countries are studied: UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China.
While analyzing the crisis’ implications, the countries will be observed in preand post-crisis settings.
While inspired by Barth, Caprio, and Levine, who see case studies as the
best option for answering similar questions, this paper has chosen to study the
1

Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., and Levine, R. (2006).
See, for example: Bank of England (November 2009); The Warwick Commission (2009);
Cohen, B. J. (2008); Nesvetailova A. (2008); and Wolf, M. (2008).
3
Kerwer, D. (2005), p. 615.
4
See, for example: Myung-bak, L (January 2010); Monck, A. (January 2010).
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macro economic conditions of UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China. First,
after a brief literature review on generic trends in international financial
regulations and an outline of research design, an assessment of the respective
countries’ macro-economic conditions is provided. Next, dependent on the
respective economies’ financial market structures, countries are divided into
three groups: 1) Market-based United Kingdom and United States; 2) Bankbased Germany and Japan; 3) Quasi-communist China. While using the groups
for structured comparisons, three broad categories are chosen as gateways:
1) Regulatory reform. Herein, the countries’ recent regulatory reforms will
be observed, whereas emphasis will be placed on the internationally
significant aspects of the reforms. The timeframe of the studied reforms
depends on a country, but the study of past reforms does generally not date
back more than twenty five years.
2) An internationally distinguishing variable. This category was chosen to
bring out the different characteristics that the observed countries uniquely
exhibit. As with the regulatory reform, the main criteria while choosing the
respective denominators, has been the denominator’s relative importance for
international financial regulations.
3) Post-Crisis conditions. This section is an assessment of the respective
countries’ economic conditions after the Great Recession.
Ultimately, since the over-arching research question is whether the
economic status quo incentivizes the creation of enhanced international
financial regulations, the comparative assessment of the five economies is
expected to offer better clarity for this matter. However, it must be noted that
the paper does not claim to depict the entire range of denominators influencing
the international financial system. Instead, while studying the economic
determinants of the five economies, potential international challenges are
identified, whereas the domestic leaderships’ genuine interest in a global
resolution is studied.
Thus, an over-arching research-question prevails: does the economic status
quo incentivize the creation of enhanced international financial regulations?
1.2 Generic Trends in International Financial Regulations
The recent study by Bank of England concludes that “financial crisis has
demonstrated the need for change” in the regulatory framework.5 Separately
from the Bank of England, the arguments are supported by A. Baker, who
argues that “renovating the concept of transgovernmentalism brings the
participatory deficits in the current global financial architecture into sharp
5

Bank of England (2009), p. 3.
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focus and points us in the direction of workable reform agenda that would
expand inclusion and participation.”6
Since the renovation of “transgovernmentalism” with regard to financial
regulations purports enhanced coordination over regulatory measures, the
crisis has certainly prepared the international stage for potential reforms.
However, what is the actual financial architecture that demands redefined
international cooperation? The literature suggests different interpretations.
First, a traditional market-oriented approach divides the financial sector
into three branches: banks, insurance, and securities’ industry.7 Herein, since
the traditional division may not always accurately depict the structure of the
modern financial industry, the recent literature tends to interpret the categories
within a single framework, whereas the regulators arguably have failed to
flexibly address the trend of convergence of the three branches.
E.g. D. A. Singer considers such a failure as the main source of inadequate
regulations- namely due to “asymmetric information” gathering, which so far
has mostly been concerned with the banking sector.8 Furthermore, as Singer
points out, since regulators are looking for “win-sets”- the conditions, where
regulations are seen effective enough for guaranteeing stability- they are
unlikely to adequately address the potential “information asymmetries” as long
as there is no direct pressure from the markets. Furthermore, this is both true
domestically as well for international regulators.
From an international perspective, the regulators’ bias towards “win-sets”
may cause regulatory “races to the bottom.” Singer brings the example of the
rise of Japanese banks in the 1980s, when relatively lax regulations on
Japanese banks created exogenous shocks, which in turn shifted the foreign
regulators’ “win-sets” from their initial equilibriums, and thus created global
pressures for deregulation.9 With regard to analyzing the regulatory fallacies
that fed the creation of the recent meltdown, similar trends are noted.
A. Nesvetailova argues that the public policy authorities “lost track of the
real effects of financial deregulation” as the dominant criteria was to beat the
competing markets with deregulation.10 Moreover, from the perspective of
appropriate risk assessment, the information asymmetries impose another
relevant shortfall. As Warwick Commission points out, the misconception that
risk is solely “inherent in the characteristics of an asset or financial
instrument” distorts the real picture, where credit, liquidity, and over-all
market conditions may pose considerable risk. Since “different parts of the
financial system have different capacities to hedge each type of risk”, the
regulators often fail to preemptively address potential dangers within
innovative instruments- such as it was the case with the MBSs in 2007.11
6

Baker, A. (2009), p. 195.
Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 10.
8
Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 13.
9
Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 27.
10
Nesvetailova A. (2008), p. 85.
11
The Warwick Commission (2009), p. 4.
7
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N. Penny, while having a somewhat different focus, elaborates on the
effect of high long-term interest rates, and disproportionately lax regulations
of hedge funds. Again, since regulators’ unfortunate overemphasis of the
banking sector has left the other financial institutions without reasonable
supervision, the actual causes of crisis as argued by Penny- hedge funds- have
repeatedly failed to “redeem some of the securities they had issued, which
quickly led to global liquidity crisis.”12 As Penny points out, the recent MBS’
triggered crisis was not the first time, when hedge funds where the main
sources of problem- so was the case with the 1998 bankruptcy of Long Term
Capital Management, which according to Penny, had “the potential to
destabilize the capital markets on a global scale.”13 Therefore, as the structural
regulatory fallacies have been a long-term problem, it provides clear evidence
for the regulators’ relative passiveness as long as their “win-set” is not in
direct danger.
For example, while briefly elaborating on some of the most important
international regulatory initiatives affecting the financial industry, the Basel
Accord stands out. After being introduced at the end of the 1980s, it quickly
became one of the most important international regulatory initiatives- mostly
due to the fact that it acquired the image as a “reputational mechanism.”14
Today, despite the talks for implementing Basel III, most of the core
requirements are still defined by Basel II (initially published in 2004), which
from the regulatory perspective, focuses mostly on “pro-cyclical regulation.”15
As argued by A. Korinek, however, since the pro-cyclical measures have
failed to prevent the banks from excessive risk taking, the Basel Accord has
not functioned efficiently.16
Nevertheless, with regard to the initial accord, a more positive tone still
prevails. For instance, a study observing the correlation between Effective
Banking Supervision (BCP) and the banking sectors’ performance in 65
countries from 1998 to 2002- time, when most of the Basel I was still
effective- found “a direct positive effect of compliance with the BCP on
banking sector performance.”17 Thus, although the pro-cyclical deregulation
implemented by Basel II throughout the boom years proved to mislead the
banking industry, the effectiveness of most of the Basel I measures provides a
reasonably promising outlook for the Basel III as it is drafted.
With regard to insurance and securities’ industries, there almost are no
extensive initiatives for international regulations. As Singer points out the
paradox of “information asymmetry” in financial regulations, he also notes
that the relevant international regulatory institutions for insurance- and
securities’ markets (IAIS, and IOSCO) are mostly marginal compared to the
12

Penny, N. (2008), p. 25.
Penny, N. (2008), p. 19.
14
Ho, D. E. (2002).
15
See, for example: Korinek, A. et al. (May 2009).
16
Korinek, A. (2009), p. 20.
17
Podpiera, R. (2006).
13
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relevance of the Basel Accord.18 Hence, just as on domestic levels, the
insurance- and securities-markets are often left without adequate attention, a
similar fallacy is reflected on the international regulatory arena.
In the following sections, five economies have chosen to be observed more
closely. From the perspective of UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China, the
cross-country study will aim to go beyond the generics of international
financial regulations. Ultimately, after assessing the over-all macro-economic
conditions, and considering the five economies separately, the central research
question will be aimed to have more comprehensive answers: does the
economic status quo incentivize the creation of enhanced international
financial regulations?

2. Big Picture
The goal of this section is to map the primary denominators that UK, USA,
Germany, Japan, and China hold vis-à-vis the global financial regulations.
Herein, not all the variables are attempted to identify. Instead, the focus is on
variables that possibly impact the respective economies’ ability and interest in
shaping international financial regulations. Therefore, firstly, the extent of the
countries’ international economic influence will be assessed; and secondly, the
structure of the domestic financial systems next to the countries’ economies
will generally be observed.
While simply using the countries’ GDP measures (see Graph 2.1) for
reference, the US’ GDP has performed the strongest throughout the first
decade of the 21st century. From 1999 to its peak in 2008, it gained about $5
trillion, whereas enlarging the already huge gap with the follow-ups: Japan,
China, Germany, and UK, respectively. Therefore, if only GDP measures were
considered, the American interest would most likely have the predominant
stance.
From another perspective, while considering trade patterns as measures
of economic power, the American dominance is not as clear-cut. While the US
and UK had current account deficits throughout the past decade, the Chinese,
German, and Japanese applicable figures were almost their mirror images (see
Graph 2.2; Graph 2.3). This phenomenon is elaborated by M. Wolf and his
“savings glut theory.” Briefly, he draws the link between the American
“consumer of last resort” mentality and the export-accumulated wealth of
China, Germany and Japan.19 Furthermore, as he argues that the net exporting
economies, especially China, accumulate foreign reserves, this creates global
imbalances, and is potentially a major source of financial instability (discussed
further under the section explicitly considering China).

18
19

Singer, D. A. (2007), p. 73.
Wolf, M. (2008), p. 152.
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Graph 2.1: GDPs in Billions of Dollars20

Source: IMF Principal Global Indicators.

Graph 2.2: Percentages of Net Exports of Goods per GDP (2005-2009)21

Source: IMF Principal Global Indicators.

Graph 2.3: Current Account Surpluses (1999- 3rd Quarter 2009)22

Source: IMF Principal Global Indicators.
20

GDPs are nominal, seasonally adjusted (except China). For China, the trend of 3 Quarters’
average was used for the 2009 aggregate GDP. 1 Yuan = .1464 USD was used.
21
Exports are expressed in terms of free on board units (f. o. b.).
22
Balance of Payment Statistics. ‘09 figure is from the 3rd Quarter . No data for China in ‘09.
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M. Wolf’s perspective is supported by B. J. Cohen, who argues that
“the balance between states and markets […] is being dramatically altered” as
the result of financial globalization, which has caused severe unbalances
between the nations that borrow and save.23 From the prism of determining
relevant macroeconomic impacts on enhancing international financial
regulations, the frictions between saving- and borrowing nations may indeed
pose multiple implications (for reference, see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Debt per GDP

Source: UNCTAD24

From a rather different approach, while observing the nature of
respective financial systems, several characteristics can be noted. With regard
to UK, for example, her financial industry has been the primary source of
British economic power for the past three to four decades. In 1993, as
presented by Table 2.2, the UK’s banking assets accounted for 259 percent of
her GDP, whereas the ratios for Germany, Japan and USA were 152, 150, and
53 percent, respectively. More importantly, while observing the British Equity
market capitalization (EMC) relative to her GDP, the ratio was at 140 percent.
Note that the next highest EMC to GDP ratio was held by the US with 82
percent. Although these figures are from 1993, this highlights the vast impact
that UK has had on the global financial system.
Table 2.2: Financial Markets Relative to GDP25

Herein, the latter provides rather significant connotations. Due to the
market-based characteristics, both the UK’s and the US’ ownership structures
provide higher rates of liquidity than other markets considered in this paper.26
This is supported by the study conducted by Antoniou et al. (2008), which
compares the capital structures of companies across the OECD countries, and
23

Cohen, B. J. (2008), p. 14.
Braga, C. A. P. (November 2009).
25
The table was first presented by Kwock, C. Y., and Tadesse, S. (2006), p. 228.
26
Mayer, C. (2008).
24
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concludes that capital markets are a significant part for both the US’ and UK’s
businesses, whereas this is notably not the case for markets that are
traditionally more ownership oriented (e.g. Germany and Japan).27
In the cases of Germany and Japan, at the same time, the latter implies that
the foundations of the two economies’ financial systems are rather similar.
This, for example, is supported by Bebenroth et al. (2008), who have analyzed
the supervisory differences between the two countries due to the fact that both
German and Japanese systems are heavily based on banking sectors.28
Therefore, from the perspective of shaping the framework for the
following case studies, UK and US as the samples of market-based financial
systems, will be observed within a single group. Next, since Germany and
Japan both have bank-based financial systems, they will also be observed as a
uniform case. And lastly, due to the quasi-communist nature of China, which
rather lacks the traits of a neo-liberal economy, the emerging economic power
will be considered as a separate case study.
All in all, due to the highly complex nature of all the five economic
systems, the following sections will not claim to grasp a complete picture, nor
will they claim to completely answer whether international cooperation could
enhance financial regulations. Instead, the focus will be on incorporating the
applicable macroeconomic denominators, and studying the literatureconcerning aspects concerning financial regulations. Ultimately, this is
expected to prove most effective in providing possible answers to the central
research question: does the economic status quo incentivize enhanced
international financial regulations?

3. United Kingdom and United States
For International
Regulatory Reform:
Stable financial industry key
for economy; Market-based
financial system; Global
UK
leader in regulatory
convergence and
deregulation.
Stable financial industry key
for economy; Market-based
USA financial system; Global
competition for the dominant
economic power.

27
28

Against International Regulatory
Reform:

Asymmetric global risk on financial
industry.

Asymmetric global risk on financial
industry; Global competition for the
dominant economic power.

Antoniou, A., Guney, Y. and Paudyal, K. (March 2008), p.86.
See section 4.1, where the study is mentioned as German regulatory reforms are discussed.
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As the market-based financial model is distinctive to the Anglo Saxon
economies, the British and American vibrant financial centers (London, New
York) have arguably been leading the global market, whereas China, Germany
and Japan have rather been the second-tier, although crucial, participants.29
The following section will consider the regulatory reforms that the
American and British economies witnessed before the recent crisis. Next, the
financial industry as the Anglo Saxon key economic sector distinguishing UK
and USA internationally will be discussed on a broader perspective, which
will then be followed by a discussion on the countries’ post-crisis economic
conditions.
3.1 Regulatory Reform
Despite most of the financial denominators, the process of regulatory reforms
sets the Anglo Saxon economies rather apart. As noted by Llewellyn (2000),
the UK’s regulatory framework has been among the “most liberal systems
around the world” ever since the Big Bang reforms were introduced in 1987,30
whereas the American regulatory framework has not followed the trend of
regulatory convergence. Under this section, first, an overview of the UK’s
regulatory reforms will be given, which will then be followed by the American
regulatory trends.
Within the global financial system, UK became the first market to
allow a single institution to conduct business “between the main areas of
commercial banking, securities trading, and insurance.” Consequentially, as
Llewellyn argues, “the UK structure has been described as financial
conglomeration rather than universal banking,” which in turn has paved the
way for global deregulatory pressures and convergence of financial
institutions.31
Until the recent crisis, the process of liberalization seemed to benefit
the British economy on a vast scale. While being eager to lead the way in
converging supervisory institutions to a single regulatory agency, the newly
elected Labor government of 1997 announced “a total reorganization of the
institutional structure of financial regulation”.32 The result of this initiative
was the formation of Financial Stability Agency (FSA). Almost instantly, FSA
became the most powerful regulator in the world (since the potentially bigger
regulatory framework within USA had not followed the trend of regulatory
convergence, nor, as discussed later, has it done so today).
Therefore, just as was the case with the follower countries- Germany
and Japan- this was initially seen to benefit the British financial sector via
exploitation of economies of scale, transparent regulation, and avoidance of
29

See, for example: Kwock, C. Y., and S. Tadesse (2006).
Llewellyn, D. T. (2000).
31
Llewellyn, D. T. (2000), p. 309-310.
32
Llewellyn, D. T. (2000), p. 311.
30
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contradictory measures by overlapping regulatory agencies.33 However, after
the recent crisis sparked, the process of convergence and deregulation seemed
to have stretched too far.34 Subsequently, the crisis came as a surprise, and the
regulators did not manage to provide comprehensive responses to the crisis
before early 2009 (when the UK’s Banking Act was announced in February
2009).35
According M. Hall (2009), the Special Resolutions Regime, which was
enacted under the Banking Act of 2009, was the first step in the row of many
that financial regulators needed to take to once again meet the “top priority” of
public policy. The SRR only contemplated the framework for dealing with
problematic financial institutions, it did not provide the tools that regulators
need for actual prudential measures. For example, Hall discusses the need to
properly “calibrate” micro- as well as macro-prudential policy so that
“systemic risk” and “inherent pro-cyclicality in the financial system” could be
reduced.36 This means more supervision, but also smarter and efficiently
drafted regulations- a conclusion that several authorities have made (e.g. Bank
of England and the Warwick Commission as discussed earlier).37
Just as with regard to UK, the American regulators reported their first
comprehensive responses to the crises no earlier than 2009. Herein, the US
Department of Treasury’s White Paper on financial regulatory reform would
perhaps be one of the most significant milestones. In its outline, the
Department of Treasury conceives the government’s previous regulatory
shortfalls: “while the crisis had many causes, it is clear now that the
government could have done more to prevent many of the problems from
growing out of control and threatening the stability of our financial
stability.”38
With regard to the previous regulatory short-falls, they note similar
aspects that several scholars have concluded (for example, the information
asymmetries for non-depository institutions that essentially conduct the same
business than banks, but are not subject to as restrictive rules). Subsequently,
the White Paper proposes six key steps for overcoming the asymmetries: “A
new Financial Services Oversight Council of financial regulators to identify
emerging systemic risks and improve interagency cooperation; New authority
for the Federal Reserve to supervise all firms that could pose a threat to
financial stability, even those that do not own banks; Stronger capital and
other prudential standards for all financial firms, and even higher standards for
large, interconnected firms; A new National Bank Supervisor to supervise all
federally chartered banks; Elimination of the federal thrift charter and other
loopholes that allowed some depository institutions to avoid bank holding
33

Llewellyn, D. T. (2000), p. 312.
See, for example, Gieve, Sir J. (2008).
35
Hall, M. J. B. (2009).
36
Hall, M. J. B. (2009), p. 53.
37
For more detail, see Section 1.2 on pages 4 and 5.
38
Department of the Treasury, (2009), p. 2.
34
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company regulation by the Federal Reserve; The registration of advisers of
hedge funds and other private pools of capital with the SEC.”39
For the most part, as the American market-based system is favoring
minimal state intervention, the fear for “big government” under such proposals
is relatively quick to emerge. And while taking a look at the lobby of financial
corporations, the industry is already working against the potential overhaul of
financial markets.40 However, given the extent of market failure under too
little regulation, the government is ambitious to move forward.
Herein, on a broader level, the White paper also outlines five key
objectives that should guide the future drafts of financial regulations. Briefly,
the objectives concentrate around “robust supervision and regulation of
financial markets”, prevention of financial abuse, equipping the government
with effective financial crisis management mechanisms, and raising
“international regulatory standards” by improving international cooperation.41
All in all, the Obama Administration’s controversial preference for
greater government intervention is quite clear. Nevertheless, since the
American financial system is the biggest in the world, the international
cooperation will certainly not work effectively unless the US is determined to
contribute. Thus, after reviewing the regulatory reforms that the Obama
Administration is proposing, it can likely be concluded that the international
markets are probably more inclined towards genuine cooperation than it was
the case before the crisis.
Conclusively, despite the recent setbacks, UK and USA have
historically been the hallmarks for a well-functioning financial system- and are
likely to remain this way for a rather long period. This will most likely be also
true with regard to creating the trends for global regulatory reforms. Herein, in
order to understand the probable national interests, the key priorities with
regard to the global financial system need to be addressed. While attempting to
do so, the next section will consider the two economies’ financial industries
more closely, whereas the remaining section will observe their post-crises
conditions.
3.2 Financial Industry
Due to the interconnectedness of the financial markets and the real economy,
the Anglo Saxon strategic interest in stable global financial markets is quite
explicit. In case of the UK, for example, the share of financial services to her
GDP rose to 9.4 in 2006.42 In the US, at the same time, the highest Rates of
Return on Sector-Specific Capital are reported within sectors such as
“Securities, commodity contracts, and investments” (92%), “Insurance carriers
39

Department of the Treasury, (2009), p.3.
See, for example: Eggen, D. (2010).
41
Department of the Treasury, (2009), p. 3 – 4.
42
Swain, S. (2008).
40
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and related activities” (36%), and “Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles”
(12%)- in short, within areas closely intertwined with the financial industry.43
Handa and Kahn (2008), while studying the financial market’s
importance, characterize the effect of intertwined characteristics of financial
development and economic growth as a “symbiotic relationship”, which, if
properly managed, could significantly benefit both financial and non-financial
sectors.44 Via econometric analysis, they conclude that the co-integration
between financial and non-financial sectors is expected to provide a strong
correlation “between the financial sector and GDP”.
In fact, they note that as the result of the model, “a more immediate
impact” between the GDP and financial sector is expected to be shown for the
US’ and UK’s co-integration variables than for any of the other economies in
the study (which among several other countries, also includes Germany and
Japan).45 With regard to the Anglo Saxon financial industry, this is another
affirmation that while drafting financial regulations, the wellbeing of the
British and American financial sectors will be the economies’ primary concern
since it correlates closely with the economic interests of all the other sectors.
Herein, the co-integration of the financial sector and the real economy
has been subject to several studies. Explicitly in relation to UK’s and US’
financial industries, both volatility as well as greater relative shares of the
respective financial industries within the countries’ macro economies, have
most likely contributed towards the facilitation of co-integration.
For example, according to C. Mayer (2008), most of the British market
volatility comes from the significant role of the UK’s stock market, and the
developed ownership structures that only the US can match. With regard to
UK, only 16 percent of the largest 170 listed companies have a single
shareholder owning more than 25 percent of the company, whereas only 6
percent of the largest companies have a single majority shareholder. If
comparing the figures to Germany, the contrast is remarkable: nearly 80
percent of top 170 German companies have a single shareholder owning at
least 25 percent of the company.46
The link between the unique liquidity of the British and American
stock exchanges, ownership structures, and financial industries’ importance is
another aspect that highlights the strategic importance of this particular
industry for UK and US. Since single shareholders are more likely to hold
long positions, whereas dispersed ownership rather increases the participation
of mutual funds, insurance companies, investment banks and other financial
institutions, the Anglo Saxon financial industry is by design globally attracting
more financial market participants than Germany, Japan or China. Hence, in
times of volatility, their financial industry will also affect the real economy
more than the economies not holding as volatile market characteristics.
43

Fisher, E. O’N., and Marshall, K. G. (May 2008), p. 48
Handa, J., and Khan, S. R. (2008).
45
Handa, J. , and Khan, S. R. (2008), p.1043.
46
Mayer, C. (2008), p. 619.
44
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Conclusively, since the financial markets are rather global in nature, it
might not be as reasonable to go too much into detail while comparing
different domestic market characteristics. However, since the vibrant financial
industry is an integral part of the Anglo Saxon economies, the US’ and UK’s
economic strategies will certainly consider the wellbeing of their financial
markets among first priorities. Therefore, with regard to international financial
regulations, it is certainly in their interest to have stabile and commonly agreed
upon regulatory arrangements. Nevertheless, this might not mean that in
reality, the explicit regulatory framework, which is suitable for the American
or British financial industry, would be reasonable for the Chinese quasicommunist, or the Japan and German bank-based financial markets, or vice
versa.
3.3 Post-Crisis
Similarly to most of the developed economies, the recent crisis has drastically
weakened both the British and American economic prospects. Among several
issues, the British fiscal position has worsened in a quick pace. While looking
at Table 1.1, it can be noted that UK’s public debt increased from 44.1 percent
in 2007 to 68.6 percent of GDP in 2009. The equivalent readings for the US
are from 63.1 percent to 88.8 percent, respectively. Furthermore, the debt ratio
is projected to reach more than 100 percent for UK and more than 112 percent
for US by 2014.
For UK, this would mean more than doubling the British national debt
within only 7 years, whereas for the US, the country’s economy would hold by
far the highest debt in the World, if the face value is considered. Cecchetti et al
(2010), while estimating the impact of drastically increased debt levels
throughout the industrial world, conclude that the Anglo Saxon current path,
as is the case for Germany, Japan, is unsustainable.47 Therefore, since the
public sector’s debt is likely to impact the efficiency of British and American
economic recovery (instead of raising taxes and lowering investments, now
should ideally be the time for the government to compensate for private
sector’s lack of consumption), the countries’ prospects are not as bright.
With regard to enhancing financial regulations, as the Obama
Administration, and the British financial authorities, have presented, the
governments seem to be determined to reduce the influence that the financial
institutions have both on the American and British economies. This is also true
internationally, as the G20 nations have been meeting regularly to coordinate
government action for tackling the aftermath of the Great Recession. Herein,
apart from the looming budget deficits, the US’ dispute with one of their main
trading partners- China- would perhaps be a relevant area worthy to follow in
the post-crisis world.
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As the Chinese fixed exchange rate (discussed under the section
concerning China) is seen to hurt the American economic interest, this could
potentially create the next international dispute.48 From the US side accusing
China of exchange rate protectionism, and China disliking the US’ pressure,
the risk for an international conflict, and a potential trade war, is certainly
there. Although it must be noted that within the past few months, some of the
heated rhetoric has been downgraded, there are still several areas of concern,
including global financial stability, for why the post-crisis US – China
relations have received notable international attention.
Additionally, while analyzing the potential economic determinants that
could contribute towards enhancing the global financial system, the Chinese
potential competition for the World’s dominant economic power could be one
of the areas, where competition between the US and China may unbalance the
rather fragile atmosphere. As depicted on Table 4.1 under the section
discussing Japan, China has already surpassed Japan and is approaching the
American GDP figures rather fast (being currently at nearly 40 percent of the
US GDP).
Moreover, since the US economic growth will likely be rather weak
due to both the private and public sector’s debt burdens, the gap between
China and USA is likely to decrease further. Therefore, overall, the post-crisis
American economic dominance is probable to gradually decrease, whereas
several emerging economies, especially in Asia, will gain some of the
advantages that America has held so far. This, however, does not mean that
the American economy would become irrelevant. On the contrary, as
discussed above, the US is still by far the main “player” on the global market.
All in all, from the Anglo Saxon perspective, the post crisis priority is
to reverse the economy back to growth. In short term, this primarily requires
prudent fiscal measures, which at the same time, demands effectively quitting
the government’s liquidation programs. In the longer term, since the financial
industry holds the key position for UK and US, it is in the countries’ firsthand
economic interest to enhance the financial regulatory system- both
domestically and internationally. Therefore, while asking whether the postcrisis Anglo Saxon system has considerable incentives for enhancing
international financial regulations, it is probably more likely to do so than any
of the subsequently analyzed economies- China, Germany, Japan.
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4. Germany and Japan
For International Regulatory
Reform:
Eurozone; Bank-based financial
Germany system; Pro regulatory
convergence and deregulation.
Japan

Against International
Regulatory Reform:

Competition with China and
Competition with UK and USA
South-East Asia; Pro regulatory over the global financial
convergence and deregulation. centers;.

Since both the German and Japanese financial systems are largely bank-based,
they are often compared to each-other. As discussed under the Big Picture
section, there are several key reasons for why Germany and Japan hold
common strategic positions within the World economy next to the marketbased Anglo Saxon, and quasi-communist Chinese models.
The following sections will therefore study the German and Japanese
regulatory reforms, which have both moved towards institutional convergence,
in a comparative setting. Thereafter, a look will be taken on the economies’
internationally distinguishing variables and subsequent post-crisis conditions.
4.1 Regulatory Reforms
For both Japan and Germany, as for UK, one of the major issues regarding
regulatory reforms has been the integration of supervision on insurance,
banking, and securities industries. As these industries have become
increasingly intertwined and therefore nearly impossible to separate between
each-other, the British leadership in converging the regulatory bodies has been
followed. In this section, first, a look at the core of German regulatory reforms
will be taken, followed by a look at the Japan’s applicable reforms. In the
succeeding section, the internationally distinguishing variables will be studiedEurozone for Germany, and the Asian regional competition for Japan. Lastly,
a look at the two economies post-crisis conditions will be taken.
With regard to Germany’s regulatory reforms, particularly, M. Schüler
from ZEW Mannheim49 discusses how Germans have followed the global
“trend of integrated financial supervision” ever since the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)50 was established in May 2002.51
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Additionally, Pellerin et al (2009) write how Japan and UK have undergone a
similar “consolidation” process, whereas the US might soon follow the path.52
With regard to Germany, particularly, the creation of BaFin
represented significant changes- although the implications are multifaceted.
Instead of having three parallel authorities, a single financial regulator, solely
responsive to the German Minister of Finance, was founded. Since the
regulations gained efficiency via reduced bureaucracy, and the framework
became considerably better to comprehend, the immediate impacts were
mostly seen positive.53
M. Schüler (2004), for example, enlists some of the positive
implications briefly after BaFin was established: “Unification allows the
realization of cost savings through economies of scale; the superiority
structure should reflect the integration of financial sectors; regulatory arbitrage
can be avoided; accountability is enhanced; and international co-operation is
fostered.” Ultimately, the new regulatory framework became able to cope with
“the blurring of borders between banks, insurers and financial service
providers”54. Nevertheless, Schüler also leaves room for skepticism by
outlining some of the downsides: “Unification could lead to lack of clarity; an
integrated agency could suffer from diseconomies of scale; concentration of
power could vitiate democratic policies; and moral hazard concerns could be
extended across the whole financial sector.”55
From the prism of a more recent study- Bebenroth et al (2008), which
compares the Japanese and German banking regulations- the German
regulatory model stands considerably efficient.56 Among other aspects, they
refer to the IMF stress tests, which analyzed the German banking sector in
2003. Based on Bebenroth et al, “the stress tests were done for a significant
increase in a borrower’s probability of default (of 30% and 60%, respectively),
for a 30% decline in stock market prices within a period of one month, for a
significant shift in the yield curve, and for a 15% exchange rate change of the
Euro against the US-Dollar within one month. Moreover, macro stress tests
were conducted which assumed that several risk factors were positively
correlated.”57 Eventually, the conclusion was that the tests “did not indicate a
risk to the stability of the German banking system.”58
In the case of Japan, while the economy was suffering under enduring
stagnation, the “Big Bang” financial reforms were initiated in late 1996.59
During the “Big Bang” reforms, which according to Dekle (1998) copied the
52
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London’s radical reforms from late 1980s, the Japanese financial system
aimed to compete with the global financial centers of New York and London.
Among several other policy-steps, a “financial supervisory regime more
consistent with deregulation” was introduced.
According to Dekle, the “Big Bang” did indeed seem promising in
shaking up laggard markets, and inducing the financial sector towards stronger
performance. However, the reforms were not going far enough as several
issues were yet to be solved (e.g. government’s flawed intermediation between
borrowers and lenders; problems with “devising tax measures that are
consistent with financial deregulation; and establishing a clear, rules-based
exit strategy for failing financial firms”).
Today, despite the initially high hopes, it is widely known that most of
the “Big Bang” failed. Okomato, I. (2005) elaborates on some of the reasons
by referring to the system’s “inability to go beyond liberalizing the securities
industry by challenging the government’s protection of the banking sector, and
to the government’s haphazard intervention in the stock market.”60 To some
extent, the turbulent macroeconomic factors could be blamed. On the other
hand, as Hoshi and Kashyap note, the “financial sector problems seem too big
to be explained by purely cyclical factors”.61
Therefore, Hoshi and Kashyap refer to the “conscious policy of
Japanese banks to keep extending credit to firms even when the prospects for
being repaid are limited”. Moreover, they argue that the banks’ willingness to
issue such loans was caused by the regulatory environment, which in reality,
simply prevented failing companies from exiting the market. Subsequently,
over the two decades, the scholars argue that the Japanese economy lost up to
20 percent of its GDP.62
From the perspective of evaluating the effect of regulatory reforms,
such a conclusion is certainly devastating. And from the regulator’s lens, they
seem to have taken the blame. E.g. Ito Takashi (Ministry of Finance) discusses
that “regulators felt justified in providing less-than-candid estimates [while
concerning] the magnitude of the non-performing loan problem”. He goes
further: “when the problem became more serious (say by 1994), the reluctance
became more a fear that a systemic crisis might result from full disclosure.”63
Along the same lines, M. Imai (2009) discusses that the bank failures
in Japan during 1999-2002 (right after the Asian crisis) were exacerbated by
the regulators’ “tendency to delay declarations of insolvency in prefectures
that supported senior politicians of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP).”64 Ultimately, he concludes that “politicization of bank insolvency
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resolution might be one of the fundamental problems that one must take into
account when designing bank regulation and supervision”.65
When asking, whether the lessons of “Great Stagnation” were learned,
the literature hints on various conclusions. E.g. Pellerin, et al. (2009)
emphasize the convergence process of various regulatory institutions, which as
with Germany, was also an important trend in Japan.66 Specifically, they
argue that as the Japanese Financial Services Authority was emerged into a
consolidated regulator between 1998 and 2000, the “transition […] was more
dramatic than in many other countries because the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
held significant regulatory power prior to reform.”67
Conclusively, the 2000s’ tendency to gather insurance, banking, and
securities regulators under a “single roof” has been dominant in most of the
developed economies (including Japan, Germany, and UK). Nevertheless, this
does not mean that such reforms have abolished international discrepancies
within the structure and role of regulatory agencies. Especially due to China,
which, as discussed later, may potentially undermine the efficiency of global
financial regulations.
4.2 Eurozone and Germany
Before discussing the implications of the crisis on Germany, in order to
adequately grasp the determinants of the German financial system, its leading
role in the Euro area remains to be analyzed.
Cohen and Subacchi elaborate on the fact that despite euro’s broad
scope in terms of covering European markets, it is “largely a passive
participant in global payments developments and remains a weak force in
monetary diplomacy.” For Germany- the biggest economy within the
Eurozone- such short-falls are no doubt costly. One of the major sources of
excess cost is the controversy between fiscal policies, which differ across the
euro-area’s member states; and monetary policy, which is conducted by the
European Central Bank- a single authority across EMU. Due to the unnatural
segregation of these economic policy mechanisms, Cohen and Subacchi call
the phenomena “A one-and-a-half-currency-system”. Subsequently, for the
German financial system, the “semi-currency” characteristics propagate
external risks, and pose excess costs (as currently illustrated by the Greek
budget crisis).
S. Dullien, and U. Fritsche add another perspective, while noting in
the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics that “the increasing macroeconomic
imbalances within the European Monetary Union (EMU)” have “coincided”
with the fiscal discrepancies of the South-European deficit-running nations
and the German budget surpluses. While focusing their analysis on measuring
65
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divergence in unit labor cost throughout EMU, and the USA, they conclude
that the budget deficit nations (such as Spain, Portugal, Greece) exhibit
increased unit labor costs above their long term average. This in turn poses
potential risks for the entire financial system, which obviously interconnects
Germany and other member states throughout the EMU68.
Furthermore, after the Greek default on its debt became more likely,
the German system- as the main source of stability for Eurozone- has had no
other option but to contribute towards the Greek bailout. Subsequently, as
Joschka Fischer (2010) points out, Germany “is withdrawing into its shell”,
which implies that costs of divergence within Eurozone are beginning to
reduce the German willingness to invest into euro’s stability outside its own
borders69.
Ultimately, in the context of this paper, the Eurozone’s intertwined
nature makes Germany unique. China, Japan, UK, and USA all have explicit
control over their fiscal and monetary policies. Since Germany lacks similar
measures over these two variables, the nature of Eurozone may pose a
potential source of conflicting interests- especially while considering key
interests in enhancing global financial regulations.
4.3 Asian Competition and Japan
By 2000s, after the “slow moving financial crisis” peaked with the 1997-1998
financial crises, the Japanese macro economy was vastly unstable.70 As
presented by M. Fukao (2007), the duration of the financial crisis introduced a
longstanding period of deflation and forfeited output. Although Fukao calls the
era a “lost decade” for the Japanese economy, and hence for its role within the
Asian region, he marks some signs for a potential “comeback” between 2003
and 2006- mainly due to “strong recovery of stock prices”.71
However, while the boom-time improvements helped the Japanese
economy to shift towards growth, the competing nations still grew faster. This
is especially true with regard to the Japan’s regional competitors- e.g. China.
As seen from Graph 2.2 and Graph 2.3, the main engine for higher growth- net
exports- was growing at a much faster rate in China than in Japan. Moreover,
although Japan remained the second biggest economy during the boom-times,
it is estimated to surrender the position to China in 2010 (Table 4.1).
In retrospect, several structural shortfalls, including financial, can be
blamed for the Japan’s inability to pick up sustainable growth for nearly two
decades. For example, Lee and Kwak (2009) compare the fast-growing
Korean economy to the Japanese, and ask whether the growth discrepancies
rely on Korean neo-liberal reforms, whereas the Japanese system has remained
unchanged. Although they conclude that further empirical evidence is needed
68
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to pinpoint explicit reasons, they agree with the “academic consensus” that the
Japanese system is not flexible enough to face the growing Asian competition.
T. Albrecht (2005), for instance, estimates the next probable
“economic center of Asia” in 20 years, and concludes based on “GNPweighted centrality indices” that Japan’s decline will be “more than offset” by
China’s “significant increase”.72 Subsequently, he argues, that “the total
economic weight of Northeast Asia is likely to decrease slightly compared
with Southeast Asia and Greater India over the next 20 years. On the
worldwide stage, Northeast Asia as a whole will grow in importance, although
less quickly than Greater India and Southeast Asia.”73
All in all, as Japan has been subject to thorough research over the
recent decade, most of the literature concerning Japan’s performance in the
2000s has considered the impact of the ‘90s Asian crisis. After the recent
financial crisis struck, however, the outlook for Japan has changed. Hence, the
following section will briefly consider the new post-crisis conditions for both
of the bank-based financial systems- Germany and Japan.
Table 4.1 China’s GDP versus Japan’s GDP as a percent of US GDP

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

4.4 Post-Crisis Germany
After the crisis struck, and the markets went downfall in October 2008, the
preventative stress tests, as conducted on the German financial system by IMF
in 2003, became real world scenarios. Moreover, in several cases, the stress
tests turned out overly optimistic. As discussed by Dieter Heribert (2009), the
German response to the crisis was often “hastily implemented and lacked a
coherent strategy”.74 This was foremost caused by the German banks’
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exposure to the US subprime mortgage markets via their investments into the
US subprime businesses.
In more detail, I. Hardie and D. Howarth (2009) from University of
Edinburgh have studied the crisis’ impact on the German financial sector,
while asking “why did the supposedly more protectionist and conservative
German banking system […] suffer much higher losses?”75 They refer to
IMF’s July 2009 statistics, according to which “9 percent of total global writedowns” accounted for German depository institutions. Furthermore, they note
that the majority of the losses were taken by large German government-owned
banks- known as the German Landesbanken (LB).76
Matin F. Hellwig (2009) characterizes the pre-crisis situation as
German state-owned banks “sponsoring American entities, so called ‘conduits’
and ‘structural investment vehicles’ that invested large amounts of money in
subprime-mortgage-backed securities”77. Hellwig sees the cause of such
reckless “sponsoring” in the preceding decade of low interest rates (real and
nominal), and “of low interest margins for financial intermediaries”, which
ultimately caused what he calls a “yield panic”78- the investors’ necessity to
cover operating costs from what they earned.
Once the European Commision “banned the state guarantees” for
refinancing, as Hellwig points out, the German state-owned banks’ appetite for
MBS’ high yield became even bigger. Hence, the stage was set rather fragile
for the upcoming collapse. When the crisis indeed hit after the MBS suppliers
started to go bust, the German financial sector was already too attached.
Hellwig brings the example of two multibillion depository institutionsIndustriekreditbank (IKB) and Sächsichse Landsebank- which both would not
have survived unless the local authorities would not have bailed them out79.
While seeking the reasoning for such underperformance in the German
state-owned banks throughout the crisis, several conclusions can be made. H.
Harald, and T. Marcel (2009), for instance, see one of the main reasons in the
biographies of the manager. As they studied 592 supervisory board members
in the 29 largest German banks, a “pronounced difference” was found “in the
finance and management experience of board representatives across private
and state-owned banks”80. Based on their data, they concluded that
“supervisory board incompetence is related to losses in the financial crisis.
Improved bank governance is therefore a suitable policy objective to reduce
bank fragility.”81
For future regulatory directions, T. Kick et al., for instance, study
explicit regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008,
75
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and conclude that “concerted micro- and macro-prudential policies are key to
facilitate distressed bank recovery.”82 Therefore, their study hints that the
German post-crisis recovery does not only depend on raising the individual
skill level of relevant actors, but also the efficiency of over all regulatory
policy.
Conclusively, the principal concept of embracing liberal markets, with
as little state intervention as possible, has certainly still a much clearer role
within the German economy. Nevertheless, systematic as well as institutional
changes are no doubt under way. This is likely to be relevant in both German
domestic, as well international economic spheres. If, at all, a domestic vs.
international delineation can be correct anymore- especially with regard to
globalized financial markets.
4.5 Post-Crisis Japan
As the subprime mortgage crisis evolved into full scale financial crisis, the
Japanese experience with the Asian crisis became an important reference
point. For example, when E. S. Rosengren, the CEO of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, gave a speech in front of the Institute of International Bankers
in March 2009, he repeatedly compared the Japanese experience to the current
crisis.83
From the Japan’s post-crisis perspective, such a “phenomenon”
provides its markets additional attention. Not only can the Japanese financial
system offer experience with regard to appropriate policy measures, but it
could also be hypothesized that due to their past experience, the Japanese
economy was more prepared for the global Great Recession. However, beyond
a mere hypothesis, most of the literature seems to deduce otherwise. Thus,
while comparing the five economies within this paper, Japan seems to still
stand in a relatively poor position.
Garret, G. (2010) states in his study regarding the world after the
financial crisis, that “the financial crisis exposed Japan’s economic recovery
from the lost decade of the 1990s as being more apparent than real, built on
booming exports to the US and China rather than the reforms so desperately
needed at home.”84 He goes further by stating that “the suffocating legacies of
massive public debt, sclerotic regulation and an aging and shrinking
population will likely consign Japan’s next decade to a painful process of
managing long-term economic decline.”85 Herein, Garret’s reference to the
public debt problems is rather on point, as the Japanese net debt is estimated to
reach 240 percent of its GDP by 2014 (see Table 1.5).
Nevertheless, not all the scholars agree that the debt issue will harm
Japan, as the yields of the Japanese bonds remain healthy, and the stimulus
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packages have managed to avoid a financial meltdown.86 Yet, this is not to say
that the post-crisis conditions would not have harmed Japan’s long-term
prospects. E.g. Tokuaka, K. (2010) concludes that one of Japan’s major
problems is the massive population aging, which risks its long tradition of
financing public debt “in a smooth manner”. Therefore, after the economic
conditions have stabilized, a “sound public debt management and fiscal
consolidation will be critical” to reduce the risk of a public debt default, and
thus, a potential breakdown of Japan’s macro economy.87
Conclusively, while considering that Japan faces a large amount of
public debt next to its post-crisis’ struggling export sector, its stability seems
rather fragile. As Japan’s economy entered the recession after barely
recovering from the “lost decade”, its stabilization-period was rather short.
Subsequently, although the boom created some “breathing space” as financial
regulations became more lax and the government’s inadequate policy
interventions less frequent, the current post-crisis picture is still rather
troublesome. This is mostly so due to the fact that the necessary structural
economic changes have not taken place yet.

5. China
For International
Regulatory
Reform:
China

Against International Regulatory Reform:

Exchange rate protectionism; Foreign
Reserves; Foreign loans; Quasi-communist
International trade.
financial system; Economic rivalry with
Japan and USA.

“From being a rounding error a decade ago, the financial clout of China now
trails only that of America.”88
5.1 Regulatory Reforms
Over the past three decades, China’s financial markets have become
increasingly liberalized.89 After the moderate banking reforms were introduced
in 1980s, the 1990s introduced a fast transformation from the former Special
Banks (SBs) into state-owned commercial banks (known as the Big Four).
After China was accepted to WTO in 2001, the reforms were carried further:
as the membership of WTO required opening the market to foreign
86
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corporations, China became impelled to raise the competitive standards for the
Big Four- the gigantic state owned commercial banks.90 Without attempting to
map all the outcomes of the financial reforms, some major implications will
herein follow.
First, once China recognized that global trade poses great potential,
explicit policy initiatives redefined its financial priorities. In 1990s, one of the
major benchmarks was “paving the way to WTO accession”, which among
several other aspects, provided incentives to reform the mono-bank system.91
For the Chinese financial architecture, this meant a remarkable revolution.
According to Charles L. Kwong, “the aim was to achieve at least three major
goals: (1) to develop the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) into an independent
and fully fledged modern central bank to regulate the national financial market
and maintain macroeconomic stability, (2) to commercialize the four SBs by
separating commercial lending from policy lending, and (3) to nourish a more
diverse and competitive banking sector by allowing more commercial banks to
enter the market.”92
Globally, perhaps the biggest impact of the redefined markets was
posed by international competition.93 After its accession to WTO in 2001,
China was given 5 years to completely open up the markets to foreign
financial corporations. To the state owned commercial banks, this meant
strong incentives for increasing efficiency. For other market-participants, the
foreign competition diversified options due to the emergence of a competitive
credit market.
Second, after the financial reforms became rapid in the first half of
2000s, the real economy began to post stronger results. For example, the
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) issued by the Big Four, which peaked
25% at the end of 1990s, was brought down to 21.4% by the end of 2003.94
Despite remaining exceptionally high for “western” standards, this was a
victory for the Chinese policy makers.
Third, the once fundamentally communist mono-bank system was
largely replaced by a capitalist financial market. Before the crisis struck, the
government control gradually drifted, especially since considerable fractions
of the Big Four were separated from direct government control, and
international banks started to conduct business in renminbis. Moreover, in
2007, right before the financial turmoil, the Chinese government supported the
Bank of China and the China Construction Bank with $45 billion from its
foreign exchange reserves to become joint-stock companies, which would
“soon be placed in the stock exchange”. 95 According to Yao, Chunxia, and
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Feng, this was “by far the boldest and toughest decision of the government to
convert the big state banks into truly commercial institutions”.
Nevertheless, once China’s economy experienced setbacks due to the
recent crisis, the Chinese government used its control over the banking
industry and “strongly advised” the SOCBs to extend loans for small and
medium size companies96. From the perspective of avoiding massive
bankruptcies, the steps were certainly justified. Ibid, it also presented the
government influence over the seemingly independent banking sector. For the
developed economies, no such “advices” could have ever worked. Did the
Chinese system have an advantage?
While considering the inefficiencies within the system, the quasicommunist system’s advantages, even if present in current crisis, are certainly
implicit, and mostly illusory. However, from the perspective of effectively
manipulating with the market and “forcing” stability through artificial policy
measures, the governments’ work has arguably been successful. Nevertheless,
several controversies, that ultimately are likely to undermine the long-term
stability, can be identified. The following section will consider two of the
perhaps most controversial measures that are likely to challenge the Chinese
official policy beyond simply reforming the financial regulations.
5.2 Exchange Rate Control and Current Account Surplus
As stated above, although the Chinese economy has become substantially less
government-influenced, the financial issues, including the Chinese monetary
policy, are reluctant to change. James A. Dorn (2008), a scholar from Towson
University and an editor of the Cato Institute, argues for instance, that China
still lacks explicit mechanisms for affecting monetary variables (i.e. the
exchange rate, interest rates), whereas the central government determines most
of the “macroeconomic prices”. Thus, while regarding the macro market, it is
important to recognize that the quasi-communist system influences virtually
all of China’s economic determinants, including their monetary policy.
First, to understand the crux of China’s monetary issues beyond just
noting its socialist characteristics, the exchange rate policy needs to be
examined. According to J. A. Dorn, “China will be able to have an
independent monetary policy aimed at long-run price stability, which fosters
financial stability, only if it floats the yuan and eventually allows full
convertibility.”97 This is supported by M. Wolf, who argues that the begged
renminbi is unsustainable next to the surplus-created “savings glut” for both
the Chinese and its trading partners98. Yet, China disagrees. Just recently,
while responding to Obama-administration’s accusations of “exchange rate
protectionism”, the Chinese officials delivered a clear response by accusing
96
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the US administration in “trade protectionism.”99 What is their rationale for
disagreeing with both the scholarly and political elite of most of the developed
economies?
Although the answer is multifaceted, several key reasons prevail.
Perhaps two of the most important reasons are China’s need to keep the cost of
exports down (in 2008, 33% of China’s GDP was exported), and control
inflation.100 Herein, the usage of “sterilization” mechanisms is what links the
fixed exchange rate to the crux of China’s monetary policy determinants.101 As
the sterilization process crowds out capital, the government creates a similar
effect to a mere increase of interest rates- with the exception that domestic
money demand is not altered, whereas money supply is being constantly
distorted through government interventions.
Arguably up to today, China’s policy has been serving its economic
interest. They have managed to keep the inflation under reasonable control,
exports have been increasingly competitive, and the economy has kept on
expanding. At the same time, as they adopted the “policy of gradual renminbi
appreciation” in 2005, the currency rose by 21% up to July 2008, and thus
lowered the inflationary pressure quite successfully.102 Additionally, the
excess savings have yielded sufficient interest on global markets (see Table
5.1).103 Hence, before the crisis hit, manipulating the exchange rate had an
important role for China’s economy in continuing the economy’s expansion.
From the post-crisis perspective, however, the effects of a begged
currency and the sterilization-policy may not be as clear anymore. Greenwood,
for instance, argues that the budget surplus has “by any standard, […] a very
substantial magnitude, and will have large consequences for both China’s
trading partners as well as for China itself.”104 Scholars from China’s Hunan
University add to the idea with their statistical analysis on “China’s implicit
demand for foreign reserves” by concluding that in the long-run, “the
neutralization policy leads to growth in foreign exchange reserves that seem
limitless”, which are “ultimately inconsistent.”105
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Table 5.1 Relative ratios of foreign reserves of China:106

5.3 Post-Crisis
Today, according to Wai-chung Lo, and Michael C.M. Ng, as the recent credit
crisis has posed the fragility of the “modern” financial system, there are no
more models to set as an example- especially given that the Chinese financial
system proved to be a lot more resilient during the crisis. At the same time,
however, they also admit that the state controlled system creates “complex
dynamics” among “the state management, and the board”, which may cause
inefficient governance, and thus harm the banks’ ability to conduct their
business effectively.107
Pro re nata, the authors note that as the financial crisis “is a recent
demonstration of the opportunistic, manipulative behavior of bank managers”,
the Chinese-exercised state intervention might play a somewhat effective
(disciplinary) role after all.108 Ironically, this is supported by the fact that
although the Anglo-Saxon liberal financial system has mostly been considered
the financial role-model, the Chinese state controlled banking sector has
proven greater resilience throughout the Great Recession. Albeit, if resilience
is left aside, since it may be explained apart from the structure of the financial
system (i.e. the amount of reserves available), cost efficiency of the semisocialist financial model is still rather poor.
It is true that the reforms of China’s monetary system have
significantly improved the sector’s performance. It is also true that throughout
the credit crisis, the Chinese government control managed to maintain the
106
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commercial banks’ credit supply and thus protect China’s businesses from
global shocks better than most of the developed economies could.
Nevertheless, as the non-performing loan rates are still high and the
government continues subsequently to bail out the national commercial banks
on a regular basis, it is not clear at all, whether the system’s long-term
sustainability is secure.109
S. Yao, Z. Han and G. Feng admit that the recent bank reforms,
especially after China’s accession to WTO in 2001, have brought about
efficiency and decreased the problem of non-performing loans.110 At the same
time, they also point out that it is mainly the result of reducing government
influence on active bank management. Paradoxically, this hints that although
the recent crisis has undermined the credibility of the “western” financial
industry, most of the increase in China’s financial sector’s efficiency is still
related to gradually adopting the very same, arguably undermined, capitalist
principles.111

6. Conclusion
Being carried by the spirit of Barth, Capri, and Levine who once stated that
future research should “trace the forces shaping the evolution of bank
regulations and supervision,”112 the goal of this study has been to observe
recent financial crisis’ impact on the international willingness to enhance
global financial regulations. More specifically, the central research question
was stated to explore, whether the economic status quo incentivizes the
creation of enhanced international financial regulations.
After choosing UK, USA, Germany, Japan, and China as the basis for
this particular study, the goal has been to test the research question in the
context of the five respective countries. Herein, 3 subject areas were chosen as
gateways for a structured approach: regulatory reforms; an internationally
distinguishing variable; and post-crisis conditions. In order to evaluate the
findings with respect to the research question (whether there are incentives for
enhance international financial regulations), conclusions will now be made
about the international implications with regard to each gateway. Later, a
general conclusion will follow.
First, regulatory reforms- a subject area that ended up circling
dominantly around two terms: market liberalization and regulatory
convergence. With regard to the two terms, several groups formed. Germany,
Japan and United Kingdom, for example were similar with regard to the
convergence trend. All of the three economies had either completely or to a
great extent, merged the financial regulators into a single regulatory agency.
109
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China’s quasi-communist system could also qualify as a single authority
regulating the financial markets. However, China has never had more than one
regulator. Therefore, China’s regulatory agency that is often intertwined with
government’s politics represents a separate category. And lastly, the United
States, which has chosen not to merge regulatory agencies and therefore
continues with system that other economies have abandoned.
At the same time, with regard to market liberalization, different types
of groups have formed. The Anglo Saxon economies with their market-based
financial systems stand somewhat separately from the bank-based German and
Japanese systems. Herein, China is again a separate entity, as it has only
recently chosen to move somewhat away from the fundamentally communist
model. While solely observing the liberalization trend, however, all of the
economies seem to be reconsidering the process of deregulation in response to
the financial innovation that got out of control during the boom.
Second, the internationally distinguishing variables represented the
variety of unique interests that every economy has in relation to international
financial regulations. The Chinese fixed currency system creates considerable
unbalances next to the large current account surplus that the country holds.
With regard to Germany, its central role within Eurozone prescribes several
international determinants that do not exist for Japan, for instance, which
otherwise could be rather similar to the German bank-based system.
Moreover, the current debt crises within Eurozone are a great example of the
externalities that the German financial system must consider in order to secure
itself a sustainable economic outlook in the long run.
The Japanese power decline is another example of unique determinants
that Japan will most likely be driven by (both positively and negatively). The
UK’s and USA’s common interest in their financial industries, however, is
probably likely to provide a common ground for the financial powerhouses
with initiating some key regulatory measures.
Third, the post-crises conditions which group the governments of
Japan, UK, and USA due to their bailout packages, government stimulus
plans, and subsequently looming national debt. Lastly, under the post-crises
section, Germany and China stand somewhat close, as their current account
surpluses keep on crowding out capital.
Therefore, over all, different areas interconnect the economies interests
differently. With regard to the necessity to reduce budget deficits as well as to
reverse the excessive deregulation, the economies appear to hold most of the
common ground. However, China with its inherently different economic
system, as well as the options that it holds to the foreign reserves and rather
good ability to weather the crisis, stands out most separately.
Thus, while asking whether the five economies would be genuinely
interested in enhanced global financial regulations, Germany, Japan, UK, and
USA would most likely be incentivized more, although their own interests
might in times conflict with each-other. China, however, with the fixed
exchange rate policy and still continuing savings glut contribution, might not
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be as clearly motivated. Nevertheless, since most of the Chinese economic
power stems from global trade, it still must be interested in a stable
environment. Therefore, although regulatory compromises might be most
difficult to achieve with China, they should not be impossible.
In conclusion, while considering the probable benefits of the study, it
has hopefully taken a step closer towards a more comprehensive grasp of the
global financial system, and the multiplicity of denominators that underlie
within the system.
Additionally, this study could be used for pursuing with a more precise
depiction of the broad and perhaps somewhat vague scope that has been
covered within this paper. Few of the many possible research directions will
herein follow: a more accurate, concise and detailed assessment of these
economic systems within the context of international economic cooperation;
quantitative studies measuring the impacts of the gateways (i.e. measuring
budget deficits, financial sector capitalization, financial market performance,
interest rate movements, and other macroeconomic variables in relation to
participation in international regulatory reform initiatives- e.g. the fulfillment
of Basel Accord); focusing on explicit aspects within the study: i.e. banking
sector performance across countries in comparison to the international
regulatory commitments that countries have taken; etc.
All in all, since the topic of international financial regulations is broad
and ambiguous, the ultimate goal of future research papers should be to isolate
small, but comprehensive variables, and then study the changes with regard to
the variables in a concise manner. Case studies certainly serve as healthy
options for such a strategy- however, case studies as well, should, in my
opinion, be designed as compact as possible in order to have hope for
objective and clear conclusions.
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